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Abstract: Since the purchase of Siri by Apple, and its release with the iPhone 4S in 2011, virtual
assistants (VAs) have grown in number and popularity. The sophisticated natural language processing
and speech recognition employed by VAs enables users to interact with them conversationally, almost
as they would with another human. To service user voice requests, VAs transmit large amounts of
data to their vendors; these data are processed and stored in the Cloud. The potential data security
and privacy issues involved in this process provided the motivation to examine the current state of
the art in VA research. In this study, we identify peer-reviewed literature that focuses on security
and privacy concerns surrounding these assistants, including current trends in addressing how voice
assistants are vulnerable to malicious attacks and worries that the VA is recording without the user’s
knowledge or consent. The findings show that not only are these worries manifold, but there is a
gap in the current state of the art, and no current literature reviews on the topic exist. This review
sheds light on future research directions, such as providing solutions to perform voice authentication
without an external device, and the compliance of VAs with privacy regulations.
Keywords: virtual assistant; data security; privacy; GDPR; internet of things; smart homes
1. Introduction
Within the last decade, there has been an increasing interest by governments and
industry in developing smart homes. Houses are equipped with several internet-connected
devices, such as smart meters, smart locks, and smart speakers to offer a range of services
to improve quality of life. Virtual assistants (VAs)—often termed ‘smart speakers’—such
as Amazon’s Alexa, Microsoft’s Cortana, and Apple’s Siri, simply described, are software
applications that can interpret human speech as a question or instruction, perform tasks
and respond using synthesised voices. These applications can run on personal computers,
smartphones, tablets, and their dedicated hardware [1]. The user can interact with the
VA in a natural and conversational manner: “Cortana, what is the weather forecast for
Manchester tomorrow?”, “Alexa, set a reminder for the dentist”. The process requires
no keyboards, microphones, or touchscreens [1]. This friction-free mode of operation
is certainly gaining traction with users. In December 2017 there were 37 million smart
speakers installed in the US alone; 12 months later this figure had risen to 66 million [2].
VAs and the companies behind them are not without their bad publicity. In 2018 the
Guardian reported that an Alexa user from Portland, Oregon, asked Amazon to investigate
when her device recorded a private conversation between her and her husband on the
subject of hardwood floors and sent the audio to a contact in her address book—all without
her knowing [3]. In 2019, the Daily Telegraph reported that Amazon employees were
listening to Alexa users’ audio—including that which was recorded accidentally—at a rate
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of up to 1000 recordings per day [4]. As well as concerns about snooping by the VA, there
are several privacy and security concerns around the information that VA companies store
on their servers. The software application on the VA device is only a client—the bulk of
the assistant’s work is done on a remote server, and every transaction and recording is
kept by the VA company [5]. VAs have little in the way of voice authentication; they will
respond to any voice that utters the wake word, meaning that one user could quite easily
interrogate another’s VA to mine the stored personal information [1]. Additionally, Internet
of Things (IoT) malware is becoming more common and more sophisticated [6]. There
have been no reports yet of malware specifically targeting VAs ‘in the wild’ but it is surely
a matter of time. A systematic review of research literature written on the security and
privacy challenges of VAs and a critical analysis of these studies would give an insight into
the current state of the art, and provide an understanding of any future directions new
research might take.
1.1. Background
The most popular VAs on the market are Apple’s Siri, Amazon’s Alexa, Microsoft’s
Cortana, and Google’s Assistant [1]; these assistants, often found in portable devices such
as smartphones or tablets, can each be considered a ‘speech-based natural user interface’
(NUI) [7]; a system that can be operated by a user via intuitive, natural behaviour, i.e.,
voice instructions. Detailed, accurate information about the exact system and software
architecture of commercial VAs is hard to come by. Given the sales numbers involved,
VA providers are perhaps keen to protect their intellectual property. Figure 1 shows a
high-level overview of the system architecture of Amazon’s Alexa VA.
Figure 1. Architecture of a voice assistant (Alexa) (https://www.faststreamtech.com/blog/amazon-alexa-integrated-with-
iot-ecosystem-service/). (access on 10 February 2021) [8].
An example request might follow these steps:
1. The VA client—the ‘Echo Device’ in the diagram—is always listening for a spoken
‘wake word’; only when this is heard does any recording take place.
2. The recording of the user’s request is sent to Amazon’s service platform where the
speech is turned into text by speech recognition, and natural language processing is
used to translate that text into machine-readable instructions.
3. The recording and its text translation are sent to cloud storage, where they are kept.
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4. The service platform generates a voice recording response which is played to the user
via a loudspeaker in the VA client. The request might activate a ‘skill’—a software
extension—to play music via streaming service Spotify, for example.
5. Further skills offer integration with IoT devices around the home; these can be
controlled by messages sent from the service platform, via the Cloud.
6. A companion smartphone app can see responses sent by the service platform; some
smartphones can also act like a fully-featured client.
As with any distributed computing system, there are several technologies used. The
endpoint of the system with which the user interacts, shown here as the Echo device,
commonly takes the form of a dedicated smart speaker—a computer-driven by a powerful
32-bit ARM Cortex CPU. In addition, these speakers support WiFi, Bluetooth, and have
internal memory and storage [9].
The speech recognition, natural language processing (NLP), and storage of interactions
are based in the Cloud. Amazon’s speech recognition and NLP service, known collectively
as Amazon Voice Services (AVS) is hosted on their platform-as-a-service provider, Amazon
Web Services (AWS). As well as AVS, AWS also hosts the cloud storage in which data
records of voice interactions, along with their audio, are kept [10]. Data are transferred
between the user endpoint and AVS using Javascript Object Notation-encoded messages
via, in Amazon’s case, an unofficial public REST API hosted at http://pitangui.amazon.com
(access on 22 February 2021) [11].
1.2. Prior Research and Contribution
There is a very limited number of systematic literature reviews (SLRs) written on the
subject of VAs. To the best of our knowledge, none appears to specifically address the
security and privacy challenges associated with VAs. The nearest that could be found was
an SLR written by de Barcelos Silva et al. [12], in which a review of all literature pertinent
to VAs is studied, and a relatively broad set of questions is posited and answered. Topics
include a review of the state of the art, VA usage and architectures, and a taxonomy of
VA classification. From the perspective of VA users who are motor or visually impaired,
Siebra et al. [8] provided a literature review in 2018 that analysed VAs as a resource of
accessibility for mobile devices. The authors identified and analysed proposals for VAs
that better enable smartphone interaction for blind, motor-impaired, dyslexic, and other
users who might need assistance. The end goal of their research was to develop a VA with
suitable functions to aid these users. The study concluded that the current state of the art
did not provide such research and outlined a preliminary protocol as a springboard for
future work.
The main aim of this paper is to answer a specific question: “Are there privacy, security,
or usage challenges with virtual assistants?” through a systematic literature review. A
methodology was established for selecting studies made on the broader subject of VAs, and
categorising them into more specific subgroups, i.e., subject audience, security or privacy
challenges, and research theme (including user behaviour, applications, exploits, snooping,
authentication, and forensics). In total, 20 papers were selected as primary studies to
answer the research questions posited in the following section.
1.3. Research Goals
The purpose of this research was to take suitable existing studies, analyse their find-
ings, and summarise the research undertaken into the security and privacy bearings of
popular virtual assistants. Considering the lack of existing literature reviews on this sub-
ject, we aimed, in this paper, to fill the gap in the current research by linking together
those studies which have addressed the privacy and security aspects of VAs in isolation,
whether they have been written with users or developers in mind. To that end, the research
questions listed in Table 1 have been considered.
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Table 1. Research questions.
Research Question Discussion
RQ1: What are the emerging security and privacy concerns
surrounding the use of VAs?
Virtual assistants have become more and more commonplace; as
a consequence, the amount of data associated with their use and
stored by the VA companies will have commensurately
increased [2]. A review of current research will help to
understand exactly how private and secure these data are from
a user’s perspective. As well as this, we will better understand
what risks there are and how they can, if possible, be mitigated.
RQ2: To what degree do users’ concerns surrounding the
privacy and security aspects of VAs affect their choice of VA and
their behaviour around the device?
As consumers adopt more technology, do they become more
aware of the security and privacy aspects around the storage of
these data? In the current climate, ‘big data’ is frequently in the
news, and not always in a positive light [3,4]. Do privacy and
security worries affect users’ decisions to select a particular
device more than the factor of price, for instance, and do these
worries alter their behaviour when using the device? Reviewing
current research will give us empirical data to answer this
question.
RQ3: What are the security and privacy concerns affecting
first-party and third-party application development for VA
software?
A review of research into how the development of VA software
and its extensions is changing will highlight the privacy and
security concerns with regard to these extensions, and how
developers and manufacturers are ensuring that they are
addressed. Additional insights might come from those in the
research community proposing novel ideas.
The rest of this paper is organised as follows: the research methodology used to select
the studies is outlined in Section 2, whereas Section 3 discusses the findings for the selection
of studies, and categorises those papers. In Section 4, the research questions are answered,
followed by a discussion on the future research directions in Section 5. Section 6 concludes
the paper.
2. Research Methodology
In order to answer the research questions in Table 1, the following stages were undertaken.
2.1. Selection of Primary Studies
A search for a set of primary studies was undertaken by searching the website of
particular publishers and using the Google Scholar search engine. The set of keywords
used was designed to elicit results pertaining to security and privacy topics associated
with popular digital assistants, such as Apple’s Siri, Google’s Assistant, and Amazon’s
Alexa. To ensure that no papers were missed that might otherwise have been of interest,
the search term was widened to use three further common terms for a virtual assistant.
Boolean operators were limited to AND and OR. The searches were limited to the keywords,
abstracts, and titles of the documents. The search term used was:
(“digital assistant” OR “virtual assistant” OR “virtual personal assistant” OR “siri”
OR “google assistant” OR “alexa”) AND (“privacy” OR “security”)
Alongside Google Scholar, the following databases were searched:
• IEEE Xplore Library
• ScienceDirect
• ACM Digital Library
2.2. Inclusion and Exclusion Criteria
For a study to be included in this SLR, it must present empirical findings; these could
be technical research on security or more qualitative work on privacy. The study could
apply to end-users, application developers, or the emerging work on VA forensics. The
outcome of the study must contain data relating to tangible, technical privacy, and/or
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security aspects of VAs. General legal and ethical studies, although interesting, were
excluded. For a paper to be selected, it had to be fully peer-reviewed research; therefore,
results that were taken from blogs, industry magazines, or individual studies were excluded.
Table 2 outlines the exact criteria chosen.
Table 2. Inclusion and exclusion criteria for study selection.
Criteria for Inclusion Criteria for Exclusion
INC1: The paper must present an empirical
study of either security or privacy aspects of
digital assistants.
EX1: Studies focusing on topics other than
security or privacy aspects of digital assistants,
such as broader ethical concerns or usage
studies. These studies might have a passing
interest in security or privacy, but not focus on
these as the main investigation.
INC2: The outcome of the study must contain
information relating to tangible privacy or
security elements.
EX2: Grey literature—blogs, government
documents, comment articles.
INC3: The paper must be full research, peer
reviewed, and published in a journal or
conference proceedings.
EX3: Papers not written in English.
2.3. Results Selection
Using the initial search criteria, 381 studies were singled out. These are broken down
as follows:
• IEEE Xplore: 27
• ScienceDirect: 43
• ACM Digital Library: 117
• Google Scholar: 194
The inclusion and exclusion criteria (Table 2) were applied, and a checklist was
assembled to assess the quality of each study:
• Does the study clearly show the purpose of the research?
• Does the study adequately describe the background of the research and place it
in context?
• Does the study present a research methodology?
• Does the study show results?
• Does the study describe a conclusion, placing the results in context?
• Does the study recommend improvements or further works?
EX2 (grey literature) removed 310 results, the bulk of the initial hits. Only one foreign-
language paper was found amongst the results, which was also excluded. Throughout
this process, eight duplicates were also found and excluded. With 63 results remaining
for further study, these were read. A table was created using Excel and exclusion criterion
EX1 (off-topic studies) was applied; following this, all three inclusion criteria were applied.
Finally, 20 primary studies remained. Figure 2 shows how many studies remained after
each stage of the process.
If we consider the first popular VA to be Apple’s Siri [13]—first made available with
the release of the company’s iPhone model 4S in 2011—it is interesting to see that the
remaining primary studies which reported concrete data only dated back to 2017, four
years before this review. The potential reasons for this will be discussed in Section 4.
Figure 3 shows the number of publications by year.
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Figure 2. Attrition of papers at different processing stages.
2.4. Publications over Time
Figure 3. Number of primary studies against time.
3. Findings
From the initial searches, a large number of studies were found, perhaps surprisingly,
given that VA technology is relatively young. It is only ten years since the introduction of
the first popular VA, Apple’s Siri [13]. However, the attrition process described in Figure 2
reduced this number to 20.
Instead of a single set of broad topics into which each of these studies could be
categorised, we decided to approach each paper on three different levels, in line with the
research questions posed in Section 1.3. The papers were divided into three categories:
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Subject Audience, Security and Privacy, and Research Theme. Figure 4 shows a visual
representation of the breakdown of the individual categories.
Figure 4. Visual representation of study classifications.
3.1. Category 1: Subject Audience
The first categorisation is based on whether the work of the study is focussed on
end-users, developers, or both.
End-users and developers are defined as follows:
• End-user—a person who uses the VA in everyday life. This person may not have the
technical knowledge and may be thought of as a ‘customer’ of the company whose
VA they have adopted.
• Developer—one who writes software extensions, known as ‘skills’ (Amazon) and
‘apps’ (Google). These extensions are made available to the end-user via
online marketplaces.
3.2. Category 2: Security or Privacy?
As this study covers both security (safeguarding data) and privacy (safeguarding user
identity), each study was categorised as one or the other. Only three papers covered both
security and privacy in the same paper [14–16].
3.3. Category 3: Research Theme
The third categorisation considers the research themes addressed in each paper
as follows:
• Behaviour—the reviewed study looks at how users perceive selected aspects of VAs,
and factors influencing the adoption of VAs. All except one of the behavioural studies
were carried out on a control group of users [11].
• Apps—the paper focuses on the development of software extensions and associated
security implications.
• Exploit—the reviewed paper looks at malicious security attacks (hacking, malware)
where a VA is the target of the threat actor.
• Snooping—the study is concerned with unauthorised listening, where the uninvited
listening is being carried out by the device itself, as opposed to ‘Exploit’, where said
listening is performed by a malicious threat actor.
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• Authentication—the study looks at ways in which a user might authenticate to the
device to ensure the VA knows whom it is interacting with.
• Forensics—the study looks at ways in which digital forensic artefacts can be retrieved from
the device and its associated cloud services, for the purposes of a criminal investigation.
A taxonomy tree showing these categories and how they relate to the studies to which
they apply is shown in Figure 5.
Figure 5. A taxonomy tree showing categories used to classify different reviewed papers.
It is worth noting that studies focusing on the theme of exploits—malware and
hacking—were categorised as such if the VA was the target of the threat actor. Further
classifying these studies’ audiences as end-users or developers also considers the nature
of the exploit; both developers and end-users can be at risk from these attacks. When a
malicious attack exploits a VA’s existing functionality, the study is categorised as ‘end-user’;
it is the user who is affected by the exploit. Where the exploit requires new software to be
written—for example, the creation of a malicious ‘Skill’—the study is categorised as both
‘developer’ and ‘end-user’ [10,17,18]. There was one study [19] that examined an exploit
that required software to be written that exploited a vulnerability in other third-party
software. Although the exploit may ultimately have affected the end-user, the focus there
was on software development and so the paper was categorised as ‘developer’.
In terms of the subject audience, end-users were overwhelmingly the focus in 79% of
papers; a further 11% included end-users with developers as the main focus, and 10% of
papers were focussed only on developers. There was a fairly even split between security
and privacy as the main thrust of the study; security was the subject of slightly more, at
47%, versus 42% for privacy. Few papers combined the study of both: only 11%. Examining
the numbers in the research theme category, exploits were the focus of the majority of
the studies; and behaviour was joint third alongside authentication as the focus of the
remaining studies. The remainder—snooping, apps, and forensics—were split equally,
with only one study dedicated to each. The primary studies are listed in Table 3, along
with their categorisations.
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Table 3. Key data reported by primary studies.
Research Paper Key Findings Categories
Burbach et al. [11] This paper studied user acceptance of particular VAs, and the factors influencing the decision to adopt one over the other. The relative importance of language
performance, price, and privacy were observed among a control group of participants. The authors devised a choice-based conjoint analysis to examine how
each of these attributes might affect the acceptance or rejection of a VA. The analysis took the form of a survey divided into three parts—user-related factors
(age, gender), participants’ previous experience with VAs (in the form of a Likert scale), and self-efficacy (the users’ ability to operate the technology). The
results found a fairly representative female–male split (53% to 47%) in terms of who tended towards an affinity with technology. Of particular interest was one




Zhang et al. [14] A case study of voice masquerading and voice squatting attacks using malicious skills; in this paper, the authors were able to successfully circumvent security
vetting mechanisms used by Amazon and Google for checking submissions of apps written by third-party extension developers. The paper demonstrated that
malicious applications can pass vetting, and the authors suggested novel techniques for mitigating this loophole. The authors have subsequently approached
both Amazon and Google with their findings and have offered advice on how such voice squatting attacks via malicious skills might be prevented from




Castell-Uroz et al. [20] This paper identified and exploited a potential flaw in Amazon’s Alexa which allows the remote execution of voice commands. The authors first analysed
network traffic to and from an Echo Dot smart speaker using man-in-the-middle techniques in Burp Suite; however, the privacy of the communications was
deemed to be sufficiently robust. The flaw was uncovered using an audio database of some 1700 Spanish words played near the device. Using those words
which were able to confuse the device into waking, in combination with a voice command as part of a reminder, the device was found to ‘listen’ to itself and
not discard the command. The attack, although not developed further, was deemed by the authors to be sufficient for a malicious user to make online




Mitev et al. [19] This paper demonstrated a man-in-the-middle attack on Alexa using a combination of existing skills and new, malicious skills (third-party extensions). It
showed more powerful attacks than those previously thought possible. The authors found that skill functionality can be abused in combination with known
inaudible (ultrasound) attack techniques to circumvent Alexa’s skill interaction model and allow a malicious attacker to “arbitrarily control and manipulate
interactions between the user and other benign skills.” The final result was able to hijack a conversation between a user and VA and was very hard to detect by
the user. The new-found power of the attack stemmed from the fact that it worked in the context of active user interaction, i.e., while the user is talking to the





Lau et al. [17] A study demonstrating end-user VA behaviour, along with users’ privacy perceptions and concerns. The paper presented a qualitative analysis based on a
diary study and structured interviews. The diary study took the form of semi-structured interviews with 17 users and, for balance, 17 non-users of VAs. Users
were asked to diarise instances of using the device and of accidental wake-word triggerings at least once per day for a week. This was followed up by an
interview in the homes of the users, taking into account details such as where the device was placed and why. Non-users were interviewed separately and
asked questions pertaining to their choice to not use a VA and privacy implications that might have had a bearing in the choice. Qualitative analysis of the
interviews used a derived codebook to analyse and identify running themes and emergent categories. Results identified who was setting up the speaker (the




Turner et al. [18] This paper presented a demonstration of a security attack, ‘phoneme morphing’, in which a VA is tricked into thinking a modified recording of an attacker’s
voice is the device’s registered user, thus fooling authentication. It demonstrated the attack and quantitively analysed the variance in several attack
parameters. The attack was predicated on a method which mapped phenomes (of which there are 44 in the English language) uttered by a known speaker, into
phenomes resembling those spoken by the victim. Three stages of the attack were determined: offline, the phenome clustering of the source voice was
performed; a recording of the victim’s voice was obtained to map phenomes between the source and target; finally, the transformed audio was played to the
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Table 3. Cont.
Research Paper Key Findings Categories
Furey et al. [22] The paper examined the relationship between trust, privacy, and device functionality and the extent to which personally identifiable
information (PII) was retrievable by an unauthorized individual via voice interaction with the device. The authors made a qualitative
analysis of privacy breaches, and the extent to which General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) has helped to address these. Using a script
of voice queries to be asked of the target device (an Amazon Echo Dot), an unauthorized user was granted a five-minute session with the
speaker to determine which of the script’s questions could extract PII from the device. The device itself was linked to several other
accessories—a smartphone and a fitness watch—and the questions asked corresponded with GDPR’s definition of what may constitute PII.




Feng et al. [23] The study proposed and demonstrated a continuous authentication model through the use of wearables. Quantitative analysis of the
demonstration’s results, when compared with existing methods, was presented. The authors’ proposed solution, ‘VAuth’, continuously
samples the user’s speech to ensure that commands originate from the user’s throat. VAuth, shown as a prototype device attached to a pair
of spectacles, connects to the VA via Bluetooth and performs the speech comparison using an extension app, or skill. By using a skill, the
comparison code can make use of server-side computing power. Built using Google Now in an Android host, VAuth was tested on




Zhang et al. [24] The paper demonstrated the ‘dolphin attack’, in which inaudible (freq. > 20 KHz) voice commands can be used to communicate with VAs,
evading detection by human hearing. The paper presented a quantitative analysis of various attack parameters, and performed a successful
demonstration on a number of Vas, including Siri, Google Now, Samsung S Voice, Cortana, and Alexa. Results of the experiment were
ultimately tabulated, showing the device used, whether the command was recognized by the device, and then whether the command
resulted in device activation. The maximum distances from the VA device’s microphone were also recorded—an important point of note, as




Kumar et al. [15] This paper was a demonstration of ‘skill squatting’ attacks on Alexa, in which a malicious skill is used to exploit the VA’s misinterpretation
of speech to perform complex phishing attacks. Kumar et al. presented a successful demonstration and quantitative analysis and
classification of misinterpretation rates and parameters, and highlighted the potential for exploitation. The attack was predicated on the use
of speech misinterpretations to redirect a user towards a malicious skill without their knowledge. The authors first used a speech corpus to
provide structured speech data from a range of American subjects. Finding that Alexa only managed to correctly interpret 68.9% of the
words in the corpus, the authors were able to classify interpretation errors (homophone, phonetic confusion). They were then able to identify
existing genuine skills with easily confusable names (“cat facts” becomes “cat fax”) and use predictable errors to redirect users to a malicious
skill of their construction. As a counterpoint, the authors offered some measures which Amazon et al. might take to prevent such malicious




Yıldırım et al. [25] This study presented an overview of Amazon and Google VAs as a source of digital forensic evidence. A brief study was undertaken with
qualitative analysis. The study was predicated on searching a VA device (a Samsung smartphone) for activity history entries relating to voice
commands that had been issued. Data including the voice command in text form, timestamps, and the assistant’s response were found. No
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Table 3. Cont.
Research Paper Key Findings Categories
Loideain et al. [26] Loideain et al. presented a qualitative study on the gendering of VAs, and the consequential societal harm which might result. VAs are
generally gendered decisively as female and the authors argued that this gendering may enforce normative assumptions that women are
submissive and secondary to men. The paper examines how GDPR and other data protection regulations could be used to address the issue;
in particular, the study branched out into asking questions about the further role that data regulation might take in in AI design choices in




Kennedy et al. [27] This paper studied a fingerprinting attack in which an eavesdropper with access to encrypted VA network traffic can use the data to correctly
infer voice commands using machine-learning-derived fingerprints. An in-depth quantitative analysis of the attack metrics and success rate
was introduced. The programming language Python was used to process traffic obtained from the network using the tool Wireshark; over
1000 network traces were obtained. The author’s software, ‘eavesdroppercollecting’, inferred voice commands from encrypted traffic with
33.8% accuracy. The authors went on to address the limitation in similar attacks which adopt this accuracy as their only metric; they





Sangal et al. [28] A study of safety issues surrounding the use of VAs by children. The paper offered a qualitative analysis of the problem and a proposal for a
solution, with an analysis of the success rate thereof. The proposed solution aimed to address the problem that a VA, in normal
circumstances and with no authentication enabled, can be used by anyone in its vicinity, whether child or adult. Several AI algorithms were
posited, based on such metrics as voice frequency (assumed to be higher in a child), intended to form part of an improved service by the VA




Cheng et al. [16] The paper proposed a novel method of ‘watermarking’ user interaction with a VA (Google Home). The authors presented a quantitative and
qualitative analysis of the problem and the success of the proposed solution. The proposed solution took the form of an acoustic ‘tag’—a
small, wearable device that emits an audible signal unique to that tag which can act as a form of authentication that is far more sophisticated
than a standard VA wake word. In this instance, the authentication is not continuous—that is, it is only used at the start of a transaction,
similar to any PIN or password. The authors experimented with tags that emitted audible, unnoticeable, or hidden signals. An analysis of
the chosen design implementation (an audible tag) was carried out using a Google Home smart speaker, of which the audio capabilities






The paper presented a study of privacy perceptions surrounding ‘connected toys’. It introduced a quantitative analysis of data gathered
through interviews and observation. Two connected toys were used, ‘Hello Barbie’ and ‘CogniToys Dino’. Semi-structured interviews with
parent-child pairs were conducted, covering three research questions—general interaction, privacy, and parental controls. Child participants
were aged between six and 10 years. While watching the child play with the toys, the parents were asked the first set of questions. The
second and third sets of questions were asked after the parent and child had been separated. The interviews were transcribed, and a




Wei Li et al. [30] The authors proposed a novel way of ‘encrypting’ user voice commands using the granule computing technique. The paper detailed a
quantitative analysis of the problem and the proposal’s success. Unlike existing VA client endpoints—of which the computing is used
primarily to listen for a wake word and to sample subsequent audio information for transportation to the cloud for processing—the author’s
model performed most of the computing on the VA device. Each sound could be encrypted using the advanced encryption standard (AES),
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Table 3. Cont.
Research Paper Key Findings Categories
Wang et al. [31] Wang et al. proposed ‘WearID’, whereby a smartwatch or other wearable is used as a secure token as a form of two-factor authentication to a
VA. The paper presented a quantitative analysis of the proposal’s success rate and an in-depth analysis of the problem. WearID uses motion
sensors—accelerometers—to detect the airborne vibrations from the user’s speech and compares it to known values using cross-domain
analysis (sampled audio vs. vibration) to authenticate the user. The authors proposed that the technology could be used “under
high-security-level scenarios (e.g., nuclear power stations, stock exchanges, and data centers), where all voice commands are critical and
desire around-the-clock authentication.” WearID was shown, using two prototype devices (smartwatches) and 1000 voice commands, to






The paper presented a study on the effect of user experience on security and privacy considerations of smart speakers. It introduced
qualitative and quantitative analysis of data gathered through theoretical reasoning and interviews. The authors discovered factors
influencing smart speaker adoption and security/privacy perception and trade-offs between the two. Interviews were coded with grounded
theory for analysis; 13 participants were involved in the study. The themes of the interview included perceptions and beliefs towards privacy
resignation, the usability of security controls, trigger points for security and privacy considerations, factors for adoption, and
privacy/security tradeoffs with User Experience (UX) personalization. The study found that users reported ‘compensatory behaviour’
towards non-user-friendly security and privacy features.
1. End-User
2. Security and Privacy
3. Behaviour
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4. Discussion
A recurring theme throughout this review so far has been the relative immaturity of
VA technology and the short timeframe in which it has become widely adopted. There
is, however, an interesting spread of subjects amongst the primary studies. Another
interesting prevalence amongst the studies was that of the particular VA used as the subject
of the research; of the papers that focused only on a particular VA, Amazon’s Alexa was
the most popular as a subject.
In order to answer the research questions, each paper was read and the results were
analysed. Each question is restated below, with a summary of key findings and a more
in-depth precis of the studies to add context to the key findings.
4.1. RQ 1: What Are the Emerging Security and Privacy Concerns Surrounding the Use of VAs?
4.1.1. Key Findings
While reviewing the papers, the following main findings were deduced:
• Successful malicious attacks have been demonstrated using VAs as the
target [15,18–20,24]. These attacks are becoming more sophisticated, and some of them
use remote vectors. These attacks are exploring different ideas, not just one vector.
• Personally identifiable information can be extracted from an unsecured VA with ease.
• The GDPR appears to be of limited help in safeguarding users in its current form.
4.1.2. Discussion
From malicious attacks designed to impersonate a genuine skill or to bypass device au-
thentication, to attacks designed to bypass VA device authentication, trends have emerged
in both the security of VAs and the privacy of their users. Any attack that allows a malicious
user to impersonate the user risks that user’s data falling into the wrong hands; attacks
with a remote vector are of particular concern due to the comparative ease with which
they could be launched without arousing the user’s suspicion. The cloud service platforms
which power VAs store a lot of data and, should that data fall into the wrong hands, a seri-
ous privacy risk is exposed. The fact that two of the bigger vendors of VAs—Amazon and
Google—have skill stores which allow the uploading of malicious applications deliberately
designed to access a user’s data means that the user is unable to rely on the fact that the
skill they downloaded and use is safe—a serious security concern.
The dolphin attack, as demonstrated by Zhang et al. [24], shows how Alexa can be
manipulated by voice commands that are modulated to frequencies beyond the upper
range of human hearing—an attack that requires planning, sophisticated equipment, and
physical proximity to the VA device and therefore realistically poses a limited threat to
the user. Turner et al. [18] showed that phoneme morphing could use audio of a source
voice and transform it into an audio utterance that could unlock a device that used voice
authentication. The original recording need not be that of the device user, which presents a
security risk, but one that still relies on physical access to the VA device.
A man-in-the-middle attack called Lyexa was demonstrated in [19] by Mitev et al.,
in which a remote attacker uses a compromised IoT device in the user’s home, capable of
emitting ultrasound signals, to ‘talk’ to the user’s VA. To further develop this idea from the
dolphin attack [24], a malicious Alexa skill was used in tandem to both provide plausible
feedback to the user from the VA to prevent the arousal of suspicion, and make this attack
remote, thus increasing its threat potential. Kumar et al. [15] demonstrated a skill attack that
is predicated on Alexa misinterpreting speech. It was shown that Alexa, in testing, correctly
interpreted 68.9% of 572,319 words; 24 of these words were misinterpreted consistently, and
when used by a malicious skill could be used to confuse genuine skills, thus providing a
reliable, repeatable remote attack vector. In [27], Kennedy et al. demonstrated a particularly
advanced form of an exploit that uses machine learning to derive patterns or ‘fingerprints’
and compares them with encrypted traffic between the VA and the server. Certain voice
commands could be inferred from the encrypted traffic. This attack is a remote attack and
consequently poses a serious security concern.
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In conclusion, it was found that the VA is becoming the target of malicious attacks
just as other connected computing devices have been in the past. These attacks show
an interesting pattern: they are evolving. For any malicious attack to be effective and
dangerous to the end user, it must be simple enough to be carried out by someone who has
not made an extensive study of the VA’s internal architecture. Furthermore, an attack is
made more dangerous by the lack of the need to be proximate to the device. Finally, any
attack must be repeatable—if it only works once, in laboratory conditions for example,
it poses little threat to the end user. A ready-coded, malicious skill could be exploited
remotely by a threat actor with limited knowledge of computer science and it surely, at this
point, cannot be long before these attacks are more commonplace.
Furey et al. [22] studied firstly how much personally identifiable information could be
extracted from an Alexa device that had no authentication set. The authors then examined
this in the context of GDPR, and how much leeway Amazon might have to offload their
compliance responsibilities with carefully written user terms and conditions. Loideain
et al. investigated how the female gendering of VAs might pose societal harm “insofar
as they reproduce normative assumptions about the role of women as submissive and
secondary to men” [26]. In both cases, the GDPR as it currently stands was found to be
only partially successful in protecting VA users. The GDPR, designed expressly to protect
the end user and their data, has been shown by two studies in this group to be of limited
utility. A study of the GDPR itself or an analysis of the psychological repercussions of VA
voice gendering are beyond the scope of this document. However, any flaws in GDPR are a
particular concern, given the amount of data collected by VAs, and the increase in interest
in exploiting vulnerabilities in VAs and their extensions in order to obtain these data by
nefarious means.
4.2. RQ2: To What Degree Do Users’ Concerns Surrounding the Privacy and Security Aspects of
VAs Affect Their Choice of VA and Their Behaviour around the Device?
4.2.1. Key Findings
The review of the selected papers led to the following main findings:
• Rationalising of security and privacy concerns is more prevalent among those who
choose to use a VA; those who don’t use one cite privacy and trust issues as factors
affecting their decision.
• Conversely, amongst those who do choose to use a VA, privacy is the main factor in
the acceptance of a particular model.
• ‘Unwanted’ recordings—those made by the VA without the user uttering the wake
word—occur in significant numbers.
• Children see no difference between a connected toy and a VA designed for adult use.
4.2.2. Discussion
Lau et al. [17] found that worries differ between people who do and do not use a VA.
Those who do not use an assistant, refusing to see the purpose of such a device, are more
likely to be the subjects for whom privacy and trust are an issue. These users were “ . . .
deeply uncomfortable with the idea of a ‘microphone-based’ device that a speaker company,
or an ‘other’ with malicious intent, could ostensibly use to listen in on their homes”.
Amongst those who do adopt a VA, users rationalised their lack of concern regarding
privacy with the belief that the VA company could be trusted with their data, or that there
was no way another user could see their history. Burbach et al. considered the acceptance
factors of different VAs amongst a control group of users; a choice-based conjoint analysis
was used, having three attributes: natural language processing (NLP) performance, price,
and privacy. Privacy was found to be the biggest concern of the three [14]. These findings
appear to conflict with those presented by Lau et al. [21]; however, the construction of the
surveys was different, as privacy was the primary goal of the study. Moreover, Burbach
et al. [11] wrote their study a year later; a year in which several news stories broke in the
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media regarding privacy concerns of VAs, which may account for the apparent increase in
concern over privacy.
Javed et al. [21] performed an in-depth study of what Alexa was recording. Al-
thoughAmazon claims that ‘she’ only listens when the wake-word is uttered by the user,
their research found that among the control group of users, 91% had experienced an un-
wanted recording. This was investigated and it was found that benign sounds such as radio
and TV and background noise, were recorded in the majority of these cases. Alarmingly,
however, 29.2% of the study group reported that some of their unwanted recordings con-
tained sensitive information, which presents a privacy breach. McReynolds et al. studied
connected toys (Hello Barbie, Jibo) in conjunction with VAs to determine, amongst other
questions, if children relate to ‘traditional’ smart assistants in the same way they do their
toys [29]. A key finding was that having surveyed groups of parents and their children, VAs
were used by children who interacted with them in the same way they might interact with
a connected toy. VAs, however, are not designed for children and are not examined—at
least in the US—for regulatory compliance in the same way connected toys are.
Although there has been an increase in user privacy concerns, there is still a group
of users who have faith that the data companies are trustworthy; interestingly, a group
of those users for whom privacy is a concern are still using a VA. The fact that privacy
is a worry is evidently not sufficient to dissuade the user from having a VA in the house.
It might be interesting to see if studies made over the coming years show the trend of
privacy awareness continuing, especially in the light of the simple fact that users find VAs
recording without their knowledge. Children relate to VAs as they would a toy with similar
capabilities and, again, it would be of interest to see if this fact increased privacy concerns
amongst parents who use an ‘adult’ VA.
4.3. RQ3: What Are the Security and Privacy Concerns Affecting First-Party and Third-Party
Application Development for VA Software?
4.3.1. Key Findings
The study of the selected papers led us to deduce the following main findings:
• The processes that check third-party extensions submitted to the app stores of both
Amazon and Google do a demonstrably poor job of ensuring that the apps properly
authenticate from the third-party server to the Alexa/Google cloud.
• Several novel methods of user authentication to the VA device have been proposed, each
using a different secondary device to offer a form of two-factor authentication [16,23,31].
• Each of the user authentication methods do go some way to mitigating the voice/replay
attacks outlined in the findings of RQ1.
4.3.2. Discussion
Zhang et al. [14] presented the only study which examined security vetting processes
used by the VA manufacturers; these procedures are put in place to ensure that devel-
opers of third-party VA extensions (‘skills’, ‘apps’) are ensuring that proper security is
implemented in their code. As their research demonstrates, vulnerable extensions—voice
squatting attacks, written by the authors to specifically target a genuine skill—have been
approved by both Amazon and Google. Combined with the findings in RQ1, in which
several VA attacks were identified that relied on malicious extensions, this finding repre-
sents a significant security risk. The authors went so far as to inform both Amazon and
Google of their findings and have consequently met with both companies in order to help
the organisations better understand the novel security risks.
Moving away from extension application development, three novel approaches that
might suggest a better way in which VA companies might improve security for end-
users have been proposed. Feng et al. [23] presented what they call ‘VAuth’, a method
of ‘continuous’ authentication, in which a wearable device collects unique body surface
vibrations emanating from the user and matches them with the voice signal heard by the VA.
Wang et al. [31] proposed another wearable that might provide two-factor authentication.
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In this approach, termed ‘WearID’, however, the wearable in this instance captures unique
vibration patterns not from the user’s body but from the vibration domain of the user’s
voice. These are then used in tandem with existing device authentication.
Cheng et al. [16] suggested ‘acoustic tagging’, whereby a secondary device emits a
unique acoustic signal, or ‘watermark’, which is heard in tandem with the user’s voice. The
VA—registered to the user—may then accept or reject voice audio instructions accordingly.
All three of these methods of authentication go some way towards mitigating malicious
attacks, such as the dolphin attack demonstrated by Zhang et al. [24]. They also provide an
extra layer of security for those users concerned about privacy by making it much harder for
another user to access a VA without permission. However, they can be considered a form
of two-factor authentication, as each of the studies proposes a method that requires extra
hardware. Two studies [23,31] involved the use of wearables which might not always be
practical for multiple users, as well as adding extra expense and complication for the user.
To conclude, there are worrying security considerations around VAs. Methods of
two-factor authentication with an external device, although sophisticated, are cumbersome
for users. Interestingly, there were no works at the time of our study on authenticating
a user entirely based on their voice fingerprint. Given the lack of vetting in the major
vendors’ application stores, which is itself a vulnerability open to exploitation, securing
the VA is absolutely essential.
5. Open Research Challenges and Future Directions
According to the results of this study, it can be seen that VAs, like any other computing
device, are vulnerable to malicious attacks. A number of vulnerabilities have been studied,
and several attacks have been crafted that take advantage of flaws in the design of the VA
itself and its software extensions. It has also been shown that VAs can mishear their wake
words and make recordings without the user’s knowledge and, even when the user is aware,
the VA vendor is recording and storing a large amount of personal information. Therefore,
the security and privacy of VAs are still challenging and require further investigation.
Three main future research directions are identified and discussed in the following sections.
5.1. GDPR and the Extent of Its Protections
Although an increase in users’ privacy awareness can be seen, among significant
numbers of users there is still an alarming—almost blind—reliance on vendors such as
Amazon and Google to ‘do the right thing’ and treat the user’s data responsibly and fairly
in accordance with GDPR or other local data regulations. Future work might examine
whether or not the vendors are fully complying with data law or whether they are adhering
to it as little as possible in order to make their businesses more profitable. The work might
also study whether or not regulations, such as GDPR, are offering as much protection to
the end-user as they should and, if not, where they are failing and need improvement.
5.2. Forensics
Although studies on the forensic aspects of VAs have to date concentrated on finding
as much information as possible both from the device and the cloud service platform,
little work appears to have been carried out on examining exactly what is stored. Future
work could look at how VAs interact with their cloud service providers, and how open the
interfaces between the device and server are. Furthermore, it is not clear how much the user
is (or can be) aware of what is being stored. This presents an interesting imbalance; while it
is possible for the user to see certain data that are stored, the vendors’ ‘privacy dashboards’
through which this information can be gleaned are not telling the whole story. Future work
might study this imbalance and find ways in which the user might become more aware
of the extent of the data that are being taken from them, stored, and manipulated for the
vendors’ profit.
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5.3. Voice Authentication without External Device
As discussed in this paper, VA user authentication is a concern, as with any other
service that collects user data. A VA collects substantial amounts of personal data, as
demonstrated in the forensics-focussed works studied in this paper. Several novel methods
for authenticating a user to their device were presented in the primary studies. However,
each used an external device to provide a form of two-factor authentication, which makes
the resultant solution cumbersome and complicated for the user. An interesting future
research direction could address this challenge by focusing on biometric voice analysis as a
means of authenticating the user, rather than relying on an external device.
6. Conclusions
In this paper, based on a systematic literature review on the security and privacy
challenges of virtual assistants, several gaps in the current research landscape were identi-
fied. Research has been carried out on the themes of user concerns, the threat of malicious
attack, and improving authentication. However, these studies do not take an overarching
view of how these themes may interact, leading to a potential disconnect between these
areas. A number of studies concentrated on user behaviour, identifying privacy and se-
curity concerns; however, they did not mention how these concerns might be addressed,
except [33], in which a few suggestions were provided for privacy and security design,
including improvements to muting, privacy default settings, and audio log features, as
well as adding security layers to voice recognition and providing offline capabilities. In
addition, it was found that when one particular VA was the focus of the study, Amazon’s
Alexa was the assistant that was chosen in the majority of these papers. Given Amazon’s
sales dominance in the smart speaker sector, this is perhaps understandable. There are,
however, many more VA systems that might be going uninvestigated as a consequence.
The results from answering research question 1 in this study showed that increasingly
sophisticated malicious attacks on VAs are being demonstrated, and yet user awareness
of this specific and worrying trend appears not to have been studied in any great detail.
The three research questions posited were answered as follows. (1) There were several
emerging security and privacy concerns, (2) security and privacy concerns do affect users’
adoption of VAs and adoption of a particular model of VA, and (3) there are worrying
concerns and security lapses in the way third party software is vetted by manufacturers.
It would be interesting to investigate further how these areas converge, as the current
research, although it is of great use in its own subject area, can have a narrow focus. It
would be fascinating if knock-on effects to other areas could be further researched by
broadening the focus areas investigated.
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